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ABSTRACT 
Carbon lock-in is referring to the prolonged utilization of 
a fossil-based energy system despite an increasing number 
of reasons for the shift to alternative technologies. This 
paper uses environmental policy stringency (EPS), an 
index published by the OECD, as a proxy for carbon lock-
in. A fixed effect and a generalized methods of moments 
estimator are used. These approaches yield the conclusion 
that EU- membership and GDP per capita are associated 
with a higher EPS. Furthermore, electricity production 
from coal, gas and oil sources has a small positive, and 
GDP growth a small negative impact on EPS.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Paris Agreement which was signed in 2016 postulates 
that the increase in the global average temperature is to be 
kept below 2 °C as compared to pre-industrial levels. 
Additionally, the participating countries stated that they 
are willing to make a serious effort to keep it below 1.5 °C. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
released a special report in 2018 which concluded that 
“unprecedented” cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
will be necessary if the self-proclaimed target is to be 
achieved (Bongaarts, 2019). Reaching such reduction 
objectives will hinge on the successful implementation of 
environmental policy that is restructuring the current 
system to substantially decrease pollution. However, 
conduct of said policy will be constrained by a number of 
factors that are economic, institutional and technological 
in nature. Inertia associated with these different forces can 
lead to a slow adoption of progressive action that is so 
desperately needed in the face of climate change.  
 
The problem of moving away from an equilibrium that was 
reached through a path dependent process has been 
discussed in the economic literature and the term lock-in 
emerged to describe it. This concept was applied to the 
continued usage of carbon technologies, which are 
responsible for 76 percent of the global GHG emissions 
according to data of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (2017). Carbon lock-in is constituting a significant 
barrier to the attainment of pollution reduction objectives 
which could be achieved through the increased reliance on 
renewable resources (Unruh, 2000). How can we 
empirically evaluate the degree of carbon lock-in and 
investigate what is driving it? Finding an answer to that 
question is important not only in the analysis of the issue, 
but also in the process of finding a solution.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
The notion of carbon lock-in is referring to barriers 
concerning the shift to renewable energy of political, 
institutional and technological nature. These barriers have 
been described by the term Techno-Institutional-Complex 
(TIC) (Unruh, 2000). It is a conceptual framework which 
postulates that a technological system and both public and 
private institutions are interdependent. Technological and 
institutional increasing returns to scale drove the path 
dependent process that led to lock-in into carbon 
technologies. A feedback cycle associated with the 
technology on the firm, industry, societal and 
governmental level solidifies the status quo.  
 
One example of a technology that is difficult to move away 
from is coal-fired power (Erickson, Kartha, Lazarus & 
Tempest, 2015). While it is costly to build a coal plant, 
operating it is relatively inexpensive. Political forces are 
actively supporting the maintenance of the status quo 
through the likes of e.g. subsidies (see Coady, Parry, Sears 
& Shang, 2017). Moreover, social forces have been 
advocating the continued usage of coal, or at least a slow 
phasing out process, stressing the importance of jobs in 
that sector. Investing in such an asset, or, more generally, 
in any asset that is prone to lock-in, flexibility in the future 
is severely restricted. One study used the level of 
investment into physical capital until 2030 to evaluate the 
effect it has on the extent of carbon lock-in (Bertram et al., 
2015). Different emission scenarios were employed, 
where electricity generation and the consumption of 
combustible fuels were identified as the most problematic 
technologies with regard to reaching reduction objectives. 
It was concluded that weak near-term climate policies 
incentivize further utilization of carbon technology.  
 
A price on carbon might be insufficient to achieve a regime 
shift. Instead, a mix of public and private investment into 
green capital will be crucial in achieving a shift to 
renewable resources (Kemp-Benedict, 2014). However, 
this shift will be accompanied by a number of 
macroeconomic disruptions, such as a change in 
employment structures, inflation rates and debt levels. In 
light of these disruptions government will have to provide 
long-term certainty with respect to their policy choices, in 
order to stimulate the necessary investment. Directly 
opposing this, it has also been argued that stability does 
not need to be one of the main goals of individual climate 
policies (Rosenbloom, Meadowcroft & Cashore, 2019). 
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon itself, the 
multitude of implications for different actors within a 
society and around the globe, and an associated general 
uncertainty, the overall direction of policy, that is, 
transition towards a low emission economy, should be 
clear, while granting flexibility with regard to individual 
policies. 
 
MOTIVATION 
Stringency with regard to policy efforts in decarbonizing 
the economy has been cited as being indispensable to 
escape carbon lock-in. However, the TIC is likely to 
constitute a major obstacle to this very goal. Through 
which channels do institutional, technological and 
economic forces affect policy? The influence of different 
factors pertaining to the political economy of carbon 
pricing have been illustrated using panel data on a variety 
of countries (Dolphin, Pollitt & Newbery, 2016).  
 
The authors constructed an index that is relating the price 
that is put on carbon within an economy (through both 
taxes and cap-and-trade systems) to the quantity of 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, out of the total, 
covered by that price. It does not include non-market 
instruments such as command-and-control regulations or 
government R&D expenditures. However, discontinuity 
and research subsidies have been identified as important 
factors that could contribute to the escape of carbon lock-
in. For the OECD countries, the Environmental Policy 
Stringency Index (EPS), a measure including these 
dimensions, is available (see Botta & Koźluk, 2014). Due 
to the broader scope, the latter is likely to constitute a better 
proxy for overall decarbonization efforts than the former.  
 
In my empirical analysis, I will use EPS, which serves as 
an indicator of lock-in into an economy based on carbon 
technologies, as the dependent variable. This 
internationally comparable index is ranging from 0 (not 
stringent) to 6 (highest degree of stringency). Stringency is 
measured by the degree to which environmental policy 
instruments, mainly related to air pollution and climate, put 
an explicit or implicit price on environmentally harming 
behavior or polluting.  It is also including command-and-
control regulations and government R&D expenditures. 
EPS constitutes a good proxy for carbon lock-in because it 
captures notable features. A stringent policy is indicating 
that barriers of institutional and political nature that impact 
legislation have been overcome. Moreover, innovation 
could be incentivized, which might help to overcome 
technological lock-in; and it can serve to change the 
structure of private institutions. The inertia to implement 
policy, another determining characteristic of carbon lock-
in, appears to be less of an issue if observed EPS is high. 
Thus, a more stringent environmental policy suggests a 
lower degree of lock-in, at the very least on a political 
level. The contribution of this research to the academic 
literature is an evaluation of the theory on carbon lock-in 
in the context of an empirical model. 
 
DATA 
In the previous section, I have elaborated on the EPS being 
an appropriate proxy for carbon lock-in. The question that 
arises is as to what the determinants of policy stringency 
are. While the reinforcement of inertia between institutions 
and the technological system, jointly constituting the TIC, 
has been cited to be a reason for carbon lock-in, it is self-
evident that the macroeconomic environment also has a 
decisive influence on policy. Consequently, I hypothesize 
the degree of carbon lock-in to be determined by a number 
of factors that can be classified as belonging to the 
aforementioned categories. I will include the following 
explanatory variables: 
 
Electricity Production from Coal, Gas and Oil Sources (I 
am utilizing the electricity production from coal, gas and 
oil sources as a percentage of the total inputs in use to 
generate electricity); Development of Environment-
Related Technologies (it is a measure that is indicating the 
per million capita inventions in the field of technologies 
that are related to the environment); Industry (I will use the 
value added by the industry sector as a percentage of the 
GDP); EU Membership (the regression is including a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in the case that a 
country is a member of the EU in a particular year); GINI 
(as a measure for income inequality I use the GINI index - 
unfortunately, data on most of the countries was only 
available for the time period including 2003 and after, with 
some single observations before that); GDP per Capita and 
GDP Growth (data on the GDP per capita is measured in 
current US Dollar). Data was taken from the OECD and 
the World Bank. 
 
Due to constraints regarding data on each of these 
variables, I will restrict my attention to a selected number 
of member countries of the organization for economic co-
operation and development (OECD). Moreover, the G20 
countries Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South 
Africa are included. The period that I am investigating is 
1990 – 2012 in the full sample, however, for some 
parameters data was only available for a shorter time span. 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
Due to issues relating to the stationarity of GDP it was not 
possible to run a regression for the whole time period 
including the level. This is why I have divided my 
empirical part into a full sample, using a fixed effects (FE) 
approach and a restricted sample, using the generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) estimator. 
 
The Full Sample 
When attempting to draw causal inferences from statistical 
analysis, omitted variable bias can oftentimes constitute a 
problem because the inclusion of every factor that has an 
influence on the dependent variable is a burdensome task. 
This complication, at least in part, derives from the fact 
that there are variables on which data is difficult to obtain. 
One solution is the fixed effects (FE) approach, which does 
allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is 
constant over time but varies across entities (Stock & 
Watson, 2015). Conducting a Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data, I conclude that it is necessary 
to include a lag of my dependent variable. While I 
acknowledge that the Nickell bias might constitute a 
problem in a small T large N context, Pesaran (2015) 
indicated that this is more of a problem if T < 9. For the 
full sample I will use the following specification: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑆$,& = 𝛼 + 𝛽	𝐸𝑃𝑆$,&,- +	𝜓/𝑋$,& + 𝛾/𝑍$,& + 𝜙$ + 𝜆& + 𝜖$,& 
Where EPSi,t is the environmental policy stringency index, 𝛼 is the common intercept, Xit is a vector including 
variables relating to the TIC, Zit is a vector including 
variables relating to the economic environment, 𝜙$ are 
country-specific fixed effects and 𝜆& are time fixed effects. 
The latter is included because a time dummy could be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Failure to 
account for that would create omitted variable bias. Said 
time effect is common to all entities but does differ for each 
year.  While 𝛽 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable, 𝜓/ and 𝛾/ are vectors of the coefficients pertaining 
to the TIC and the economic environment respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity could lead to a false conclusion 
regarding the validity of my estimates, which is why I have 
used robust standard errors that are clustered at country 
level (see Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
The Restricted Sample 
A unit root test on my subsample (2008 – 2012) indicates 
that all of my data is stationary in levels. This time frame 
was chosen because it is including the most recent data, 
which could be important in the dynamic field of 
environmental policy. However, a concern that arises is the 
considerable bias of the fixed effects estimator if T is small 
due to correlation of the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term (Pesaran, 2015). A possible remedy for this 
problem is the generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
estimator which is exploiting “internal instruments”.  Their 
usage is not restricted to the dependent variable but can 
also be utilized for possibly endogenous explanatory 
variables as they themselves are correlated with the error 
term. Hence, while I have assumed my regressors to be 
strictly exogenous in the previous estimates, this approach 
is also well suited to address endogeneity concerns 
(Roodman, 2009). 
 
RESULTS 
The results from the FE and the GMM estimates are mixed. 
This is not only due to the different nature of the 
approaches but also due to the different time periods 
investigated. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive some 
general conclusions from my estimates. Firstly, in most of 
the specifications the dependence on past values of 
stringency is evident. One factor contributing to this is the 
nature of the policy-making process, which is oftentimes 
rather slow. An interesting thing to note is that this 
dependency decreased when estimating a regression that is 
utilizing more recent data. It is likely that the seriousness 
of climate change has been recognized and countries which 
have been displaying inertia to implement stringent policy 
at the beginning of my sample are increasingly willing to 
do so. Notwithstanding, the implementation of a relevant 
legislation, such as the EU Emission Trading System 
(ETS), does lead to a one time jump in EPS. Such 
observations, where EPSt is substantially different from 
EPSt-1, will carry more weight if the time span investigated 
is shorter and lead to a lower magnitude of the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable.  
 
Secondly, countries that have been relying more 
extensively on fossil fuels in the electricity production did 
seem to be more stringent in their environmental policy 
over the complete time horizon. This might be a reason for 
slight optimism, considering that the problem of a carbon 
intensive energy sector has been realized by policy makers 
and that this sector does not constrain action as evaluated 
by environmental policy. However, considering that the 
cross-sectional mean of the share of carbon used in 
electricity producing stayed relatively constant between 
1990 and 2012, decreasing from 57.57 percent to 54.02 
percent, whereas the mean of stringency in environmental 
policy did increase substantially from 0.75 to 2.70, there is 
some evidence that this increased stringency is failing to 
reduce the usage of fossil fuels, at least in electricity 
production. Taking into account the lifetime of a coal 
power station (between 40 and 50 years) or a gas power 
station (around 30 years) this should not be surprising, and 
one might expect the effect of policy to materialize with a 
substantial delay.   
 
Thirdly, EU membership has a positive impact on the 
pursuit of EPS objectives. This does indicate that some 
measures introduced by the EU could serve as a role model 
for other governments, political unions or economic 
unions, that are willing to tackle climate change through 
strict environmental policy. It is not unlikely that some 
countries which are part of the union are more ambitious 
in their decarbonization effort mainly because their 
membership requires them to.   
 
Lastly, while GDP growth has a negative effect on 
stringency, the level of the GDP has a positive impact. It 
does seem plausible that economies that are growing faster 
are less willing to constrain this growth in the short-run 
through the implementation of strict environmental policy. 
Furthermore, the positive effect of the level can be 
understood as demonstrating the ease with which 
stringency can be exercised in the case that a country is 
wealthy enough to afford such an approach. Combining 
these two insights yields an alarming conclusion. In 2018, 
the fastest growing economies were on the lower end of 
the global income distribution (International Monetary 
Fund, 2019). Hence, both the level and the growth effect 
would indicate a low level of stringency.  In the case that 
these countries will embark on a similar trajectory as the 
countries within my sample with regard to the 
development of their economy and the implementation of 
policy, it is hard to believe that climate change can be 
tackled effectively on a global scale. While a high level of 
growth would ultimately culminate in a high level of GDP, 
the latter being associated with increased stringency, the 
urgency of the issue might not leave a lot of room to wait 
for this effect to occur. This is the reason why cooperation 
between mature economies, which are responsible for a 
significant amount of the pollution during the last decades, 
and low-income countries, which are aspiring to reach the 
same level of prosperity, is indispensable. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Evidently, there are limitations to this research. The data I 
have utilized is not complete and there are some missing 
observations. If there is a pattern for certain variables 
where data is not available, this has the potential of 
introducing a bias to my results. Furthermore, as discussed 
previously, the strict exogeneity assumption pertaining to 
the electricity production from carbon sources in the FE 
estimates might pose an issue. It could also be the case that 
other variables, such as the industry share, are endogenous 
to my model due to the fact that the level of stringency in 
environmental policy will impact them. Omitted variable 
bias could also constitute a problem. While the FE and the 
GMM estimates allow to control for unobserved factors 
that are constant over time, it is not accounting for 
variables that might change over time and that I have failed 
to include in my model. Future research could investigate 
a set of developing or low-income countries and see 
whether and to which extent they differ from the sample 
used in this study. Furthermore, it could include variables 
that have not been considered in this research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research is the first one to use the stringency of 
environmental policy to empirically evaluate carbon lock-
in and the factors that determine it. Through a FE 
approach, it has illustrated the drivers behind the 
implementation of a stringent policy between 1990 and 
2012 in countries that belong to the OECD or the G20. In 
addition to that, the GMM estimator was used to conduct 
an analysis of a shorter and more recent time span. The 
implications of the results are that countries which have 
been more reliant on fossil inputs in their electricity 
production are appearing to be more stringent in their 
policy. Moreover, membership in the EU increased the 
value of EPS. Ultimately, while richer countries appear to 
experience a lower degree of carbon lock-in, GDP growth 
is constituting an obstacle to a decarbonization of the 
economy. With regard to the sample that has been 
investigated this would call for either a successful 
decoupling of economic growth and the pursuit of 
pollution objectives, if somehow possible, or, in the light 
of climate change, for a questioning of the omnipresent 
growth rational as such. While growth will lead to an 
increased stringency in the future due to a higher level of 
GDP, a debate about urgency is necessary. Furthermore, it 
is much needed that low-income countries are taking a 
different path in their development than the OECD and 
G20 countries, as for otherwise pollution will vastly 
increase. Due to the prosperity of the latter set of 
economies, which are also responsible for most of the 
GHG emissions in the past, global cooperation and 
assistance, if necessary, in the implementation of a 
stringent environmental policy is indispensable. 
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